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Vulnerability and risk management among Turkmen leaseholders 
Abstract 
High risk is inherent to agriculture in Turkmenistan, a post-socialist desert country where 
the political uncertainties of transition exacerbate natural unpredictability. This study examines 
risk coping strategies of Turkmen farmers based on a survey of 1100 respondents carried 
out in 2002 in all five provinces. We propose a new composite index of vulnerability, which 
includes human capital indicators and geographic location. The analysis relies on a single 
independent variable, which nevertheless incorporates the effect of criteria interactions. 
Using survey data, we analyze income smoothing as a mechanisms of risk 
management across vulnerability groups. Consistently with theoretical expectations, the 
most vulnerable households seem prefer a smaller, but safer outcome over a larger but 
uncertain one: the most vulnerable households tend to specialize in wheat, which is less 
risky (and less profitable) than cotton, while less vulnerable households emphasize cotton. 
However, contrary to expectations and findings in other countries, Turkmen farmers do not 
follow many of the common risk coping strategies. The more vulnerable households do not 
readily diversify their income generating activities: they seldom take off-farm employment; 
rarely engage in cottage industries; do not diversify the production mix on their household 
plot. Nor is there evidence that the more vulnerable families show greater reliance on their 
subsistence household plot. The results seem to suggest that the more vulnerable 
households are trapped in a deep vulnerability trap, lacking initiative and probably 
resources to break out through income diversification strategies. 
 
JEL classifications: D1, J2, Q12  
Key words: agriculture, Turkmenistan, transition, vulnerability, income smoothing. 
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Introduction 
Uncertainty and risk are essential features of agricultural activities and have important 
consequences for the agents involved, as well as for society at large. Farming in a post-
socialist desert country, such as Turkmenistan, is particularly risky, as the political 
uncertainties of transition are added to natural unpredictability. The importance of risk in 
everyday lives is probably one major difference between poor and rich countries (Besley 
1995), and models that include risk may provide a better prediction of farmers’ behavior as 
they adapt to the new conditions in transition countries. 
This study examines risk coping strategies among Turkmen farmers. A large volume 
of literature deals with farmer risk aversion, but most of it is restricted to developed 
economies. Few systematic farm-level studies of production under uncertainty in less-
developed countries are available [Kurosaki 1997 (Pakistan), Maatman et al. 2002 (Burkina 
Faso), Brennan 2002 (Vietnam)]. To the best of our knowledge, this is a first analysis of the 
behavior of Turkmen farmers, or of any of Central Asia’s post-socialist farmers, with 
respect to production, consumption and time allocation decisions in a risk framework. 
Turkmenistan is a poor country, though it has large reserves of natural gas and oil. 
Farmers’ low incomes and high share of the labor force, primitive and often inaccessible 
health care, outdated technology, and harsh climate expose rural households to three out of 
the five risk types defined by Hardaker et al. (1997): production, personal and institutional. 
Production risk is mainly caused by rainfall variability and access to water: Turkmen 
agriculture is highly dependent on irrigation as 80% of Turkmenistan is desert. Personal 
risk is high, first, due to hard living conditions in rural regions and the highly polluted 
water and soil; and, second, due to the sharp reduction of the healthcare system, particularly 
in rural regions. Institutional risk includes the corruption of the Turkmen state and the 
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unpredictability of its legislation; obliged to produce under state orders, leaseholders depend 
on the arbitrary decisions of government bureaucrats. The other two risk types, market (price) 
risk and financial risk, are less relevant for Turkmen agriculture. Price risk is not relevant 
as farmers are subject to state orders, meaning that procurement prices for cotton and wheat 
as well as subsidized prices for inputs are fixed by the state. Financial risk is not particularly 
relevant because investment financing and working capital are provided through government 
programs at deeply negative real interest rates and with high levels of credit targeting. 
After 1996, the dominant form of land use in Turkmenistan is family-based 
leaseholding, with leaseholders organized into 592 peasant associations that replaced the 
traditional collective and state farms (90% of agricultural land). Collective land holdings 
were divided into plots and leased to families, while the overall collective structure and 
state ownership of land were retained, resulting in more state control than in other post-
soviet republics. In addition to leaseholds, almost all rural families have small household 
plots for subsistence purposes; they occupy 7% of agricultural land (Lerman and Brooks 
2001; Lerman and Stanchin 2004).  
In Soviet days farmers used to be salaried workers in collectives, while now they are 
responsible for production on their leaseholds. Thus, the risk levels they face have 
substantially grown. A bad wheat or cotton crop may put them in serious trouble. 
Moreover, a bumper crop does not, by itself, ensure a family’s food supply, as there may be 
substantial delays (up to 5 months) between harvest and payment. Household plots remain 
important as a source of food and cash income, especially for more vulnerable families.  
Official statistics about Turkmen agriculture are often unavailable or unreliable. The 
present study is based on unique data from a survey of leaseholders in Turkmenistan, 
undertaken in 2002 by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem with local counterparts as part 
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of a USAID/CDR funded research project (for survey details see Lerman and Stanchin 
2004). The survey included 1100 households in all five provinces.  
We use the survey data to examine how farmers’ vulnerability affects their risk 
management strategies. We expect that the higher the vulnerability, the higher the risk 
avoidance as expressed in the farmer’s use of income smoothing strategies. Vulnerability is 
defined as “the exposure to uninsured risk leading to a socially unacceptable level of well-
being” (Hoogeveen et al. 2004), but there is no accepted measure of vulnerability in the 
literature. Vulnerability is usually quantified by various proxy indicators and households 
are classified into vulnerability groups by a single factor (McKenzie 2003; Rubio and 
Soloaga 2004). We propose a new composite index of vulnerability, taking into account 
age, education, the number of dependents, and geographic location. This still gives one 
independent variable for analysis, but it takes into account the effect of criteria interactions. 
 
Quantifying vulnerability 
A farmer’s response to risk depends on his objective situation (vulnerability). The first step 
is to quantify the farmer’s vulnerability according to the following criteria, chosen on the 
basis of existing literature and Turkmen specificity. 
Age of the household head – Age is related to vulnerability for several reasons (Sung 
and Hanna 1996): health, chances of finding a job, and the investment horizon all decline 
with age, increasing vulnerability; experience, on the other hand, grows with age, reducing 
vulnerability.  
Education of the household head – Households with better educated heads are less 
vulnerable (Glewwe and Hall 1998), because better education improves the chances to get 
an outside job. Moreover, better education could foster better agricultural performance. 
   6
Percent of dependents – Since children do not work, households with more children 
are more vulnerable (Glewwe and Hall 1998). We defined dependents as younger than 12 
and 60+. The age limits are determined by life expectancy (61 years) and by the practice of 
making young children work.  
Region suitability for agriculture – In the regions where soils and climate are less suitable 
for agriculture, production risk is higher and farmers are more vulnerable. We used velayat 
(province) as the regional variable reflecting both climatic conditions and land quality. 
Based on the literature, we scored the vulnerability effect of each variable as shown in 
table 1, using values from 1 for lowest vulnerability to 5 for highest. 
 
Table 1. Quantifying vulnerability parameters 
Parameter  Vulnerability 












23-37 Higher  complete 
and incomplete 
0-20 Mary,  Lebap 
2  17-22, 38-46  Technical and 
special secondary
21-40 Akhal,  Dashoguz
3 47-55  General 
secondary 
41-60 Balkan 





65-77 No  education  81-100   
 
The composite vulnerability score is the sum of scores of the four components; it 
ranged from 4 to 15. The small extreme vulnerability groups were merged with their 
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neighbors, reducing the total number to seven – from group 1 for least vulnerable to group 
7 for most vulnerable (table 2). 
 
Table 2. Leaseholder distribution by vulnerability in the survey 
Vulnerability group  Number of respondents  Percent of respondents 
1 (least vulnerable)  41  3.7 
2 116  10.5 
3 254  23.1 
4 321  29.2 
5 251  22.8 
6 75  6.8 
7 (most vulnerable)  42  3.9 
Total 1100 100.0 
 
Our composite vulnerability score is based entirely on human capital and 
environmental variables. Wealth and physical capital are excluded, because in our analysis 
they are treated as decision variables for farmers in different vulnerability groups. 
Nevertheless, family income is observed to decrease significantly from the least vulnerable 
to the most vulnerable groups, suggesting that our score is consistent with the standard 
view of vulnerable populations as poor (the coefficient of correlation between family 
income and vulnerability score in the survey is −0.113, p = 0.000).  
 
Risk coping strategies and vulnerability 
We correlated the composite vulnerability scores with one of the main risk management 
strategies – income smoothing (Morduch 1995). Under this strategy, households can 
counteract high vulnerability by several techniques: (1) diversify income sources, including 
   8
mixed farming, cottage industries, and off-farm jobs; (2) shift production into more 
conservative, though possibly less profitable, modes ; (3) rely to a greater extent on the 
subsistence plot, allocating more labor to ensure food supply for the household.  
We use regression to test how leaseholders in different vulnerability groups apply 
these three income smoothing techniques. Each variable representing an income smoothing 
technique is used as the dependent variable in one of the tests and the vulnerability score is 
taken as a continuous independent variable. When the dependent variable is binary (a 
yes/no dichotomy for households with and without off-farm jobs), we run a logistic 
regression of this binary variable on the numerical values of the variability scores. When a 
dependent variable is continuous (the area of the household plot or the percent of output 
consumed by the family), we run a simple bivariate regression of this variable on the 
variability scores. In both settings, the sign of the regression coefficient and its significance 
show how the observed data fit the theoretically expected variation across vulnerability 
groups.   
1) Diversification 
Households can diversify their income by augmenting commercial (leasehold) farming with 
off-farm jobs and cottage industries (embroidery, carpentry, pottery, carpet making, etc.). 
Table 3 (column 1) shows the percentage of households with off-farm earned income.  
Contrary to expectations, off-farm income is much more widespread among the less 
vulnerable groups (1 to 4). Simple logistic regression estimating the probability of having 
off-farm income as a function of the vulnerability group shows that participation in off-
farm occupation decreases as vulnerability increases (the regression coefficient is negative, 
p = 0.000).  
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Mixed farming – whether producing crops and livestock or growing wheat and cotton 
– is another diversification technique for coping with risk. Table 3 (column 2) shows that 
farmers practicing mixed crop and livestock farming on their leasehold plot fall in the least 
vulnerable groups (groups 1 and 2), whereas farmers in the most vulnerable groups (groups 
5-7) do not take advantage of this diversification technique. The same pattern is observed 
for livestock on subsistence-oriented household plots: most families keep animals, but the 
proportion of household plots with livestock is the highest (100%) for the least vulnerable 
groups, declining to 71% for the most vulnerable ones. 
On the other hand, column 3 in Table 3 shows that the proportion of farms growing 
both wheat and cotton significantly increases with increasing vulnerability. While the more 
vulnerable apparently cannot afford to diversify into relatively capital intensive livestock 
production, they instead can and do grow two commercial crops.  
The tentative indication that farmers diversify into more than one crop for commercial 
(leasehold) production prompted us to check the crop diversification patterns on the 
household plot. Here the results again are contrary to theoretical expectations. The higher 
the vulnerability, the smaller the number of crops grown on the household plot (Table 3, 
column 4). The more vulnerable families probably stick to essentials – potatoes and 
vegetables – on their household plot, whereas less vulnerable families additionally grow 
wheat for the animals they keep (see above) as well as some luxury foods, such as grapes, 
melons, and fruit. 
2) Specialization of the commercial farm – selecting less risky policy 
Among the farmers surveyed, commercial (leasehold) production is generally monoculture: 
most leaseholders grow only wheat or only cotton on their leasehold plot. Allocation of 
land is conditional on growing at least one of these “strategic” crops, but the leaseholders 
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Table 3. Income smoothing by diversification and specialization 
Diversification of income sources  Farm specialization, % of 
















crops on the 
household 
plot* 
only wheat*  only cotton*
Vulnerabili-
ty group 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1 68  7.3 2 3.7  39  54 
2 54  2.6 3 3.1  52  44 
3 53  0.4 6 2.8  48  43 
4 52  0.3 9 2.5  50  37 
5  39  –   14 2.0 56 24 
6 23   – 13  2.4  52  31 
7 33   – 7 2.1  64  21 
Total 47  0.7  9  2.6  52  36 
* The differences across vulnerability groups are statistically significant at p ≤ 0.1 for all 
columns (by logistic regression for columns 1-3 and bivariate regression for columns 4-6). 
 
are free to decide what commodity to specialize in. Wheat is known to be less risky than 
cotton when assessed by variability of yields (FAOSTAT, 2005). Cotton is much more 
input-intensive and requires large quantities of fertilizers to maintain soil fertility over time 
(Ahmed and Kuhlmann 2004), which also makes it riskier than wheat. Theory accordingly 
suggests that the most vulnerable households will tend to specialize in the less risky wheat, 
even though it is less profitable than cotton (Guchgeldiev 1999) shows that in Turkmenistan 
one hectare of cotton yields cash revenue six times higher than wheat). This is indeed 
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demonstrated by columns 5-6 in Table 3, where the proportion of wheat farmers is much 
higher among the high vulnerability groups.  
3) Reliance on subsistence production from the household plot 
Reliance on subsistence production can be analyzed by looking at the size of the household 
plot and the allocation of labor (Table 4). Household plot size shows a clear trend – farmers 
with higher vulnerability have larger household plots (column 2). The labor pool of the 
more vulnerable groups is also larger, as is evident from the larger family size, especially in 
groups 6-7 (column 1). Thus, given the larger land and labor endowments, there is a 
potential for more subsistence production in the more vulnerable groups. However, 
contrary to expectations, more vulnerable households use fewer workers and provide fewer 
working hours on the household plot than less vulnerable ones (columns 3-4). Measures of 
labor allocation – the share of workers or hours devoted to the household plot out of the 
family’s total – do not show significant differences across vulnerability groups (Table 4, 
columns 5-6). The more vulnerable households may be unable to realize the potential of 
greater land and labor endowments because of the higher average age of the household 
head and the higher proportion of people not of working age (i.e., dependents).  
The household plot is intended to supplement the family’s food supply. Only 
surpluses remaining after the family needs are satisfied may be sold for cash. We 
accordingly expect the more vulnerable families to consume a higher proportion of their 
output than the less vulnerable ones. The data in Table 5 indeed show that the most 
vulnerable families (groups 6-7) consume more of the milk and meat they produce than the 
least vulnerable families (groups 1-2; the difference is statistically significant). The pattern 
with regard to vegetables, potatoes and eggs is not conclusive: there are no statistically 
significant differences across vulnerability groups for these products. 
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Table 4. Land and labor on the household plot 
Share of HHP labor 













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1 5.61  0.18  4.27  1395  53  31 
2 5.32  0.17  3.84  1330  51  31 
3 5.45  0.18  3.69  1133  49  27 
4 6.02  0.20  3.39  1020  50  27 
5 5.91  0.20  3.02  1245  49  28 
6 6.32  0.21  3.87  979  49  32 
7 6.67  0.21  2.79  1092  52  31 
* The differences across vulnerability groups are statistically significant at p ≤ 0.1 for 
columns 1-3 (bivariate regression); no statistically significant differences for columns 4-6. 
 
Table 5. Consumption of household plot products (% of output consumed by the family) 
Vegetables Potatoes  Meat*    Milk*  Eggs  Vulnerability 
group  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1  87 86 35 67 87 
2  73 81 51 76 80 
3  78 82 72 82 88 
4  82 82 73 78 85 
5  80 86 90 79 89 
6  79 77 75 89 88 
7  66 81 96 87 84 
Total  79 82 72 80 86 
* Differences in meat and milk consumption across vulnerability groups significant at p ≤ 
0.1 (bivariate regression). 
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Contrary to theoretical expectations, the share of the household plot in family 
income (value of consumption plus cash revenue from sales) is lower for the more vulnerable 
groups (Table 6), although the difference is not statistically significant. This is the ultimate 
proof that the vulnerable households do not exploit their potential advantages as reflected in 
larger plot size and greater availability of labor. The share of income from off-farm 
occupation is of course low for the most vulnerable households, because they do not readily 
diversify into off-farm jobs (see above). Yet the most vulnerable households receive nearly 
30% of their income from pensions and other social transfers, almost as much as from the 
leasehold farm. It is quite possible that the high level of welfare support takes off some of 
the pressure for better achievements in household plot farming and off-farm work.  
 
Table 6. Share of various sources in total family income (%) 
Vulnerability 
group 
Lease plot   HHP  Pension* 
Off-farm 
sources*  
1 42  40 1 16 
2 39  40 3 17 
3 48  37 3 11 
4 44  38 6 13 
5 49  36 6 10 
6 36  41  15 8 
7 34  28  28 8 
Total 44  37  6  12 
* Differences in share of pension and off-farm sources across vulnerability groups 
significant at p ≤ 0.1 (bivariate regression). 
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Conclusion 
Having derived a composite vulnerability score based on human capital and environmental 
factors, we expected to find that Turkmen farmers use income smoothing to manage risk 
and counteract vulnerability. Contrary to our expectations and the findings in other 
countries, Turkmen farmers do not follow many of the common risk coping strategies.  
Thus, the more vulnerable the household, the less it diversifies its income generating 
activities. Members of the more vulnerable families seldom take off-farm employment and 
do not engage in cottage industries. While underdeveloped labor markets may prevent older 
people and people with lower educational attainments (i.e., members of high vulnerability 
groups according to our classification) from finding off-farm jobs even if they try, it is 
difficult to understand the failure to take advantage of cottage industries, in which even the 
old and the uneducated can participate. Perhaps the more vulnerable families lack the 
money for the required investment (a furnace to burn pottery, weaving equipment, wood 
working instruments, etc) and perhaps they simply lack the initiative.  
The more vulnerable farmers do not tend to diversify their agricultural production 
either: fewer among them keep livestock and they grow a smaller number of crops on the 
household plot than the less vulnerable groups. Again, the failure to practice livestock 
production may be due to lack of investment funds, while lack of animals may rule out the 
need for adding wheat (staple livestock feed) to crops on the household plot.  
Finally, there is no evidence that the more vulnerable families rely to a greater extent 
on household plot production. We expected that more vulnerable households would devote 
more time to the safer subsistence plot. This does not appear to be true – the labor input in 
the household plot is actually less among the more vulnerable families. It seems that the 
more vulnerable families fail to take advantage of their larger land and labor endowments 
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as risk management tools. Instead, they appear to rely to a significant extent on pensions 
and social transfers. 
Consistently with theoretical expectations, the most vulnerable households seem to 
prefer a smaller, but safer outcome over a larger but uncertain one. This is evident in the 
greater specialization of the more vulnerable households in wheat, which is less risky (and 
less profitable) than cotton. However, this appears to be just one glimmer of light in the 
long saga of failures to manage risk through income smoothing.  
We come out of this study with the depressing feeling that the more vulnerable groups 
among Turkmen farmers are somehow caught in a deep vulnerability trap. They cannot or 
will not adopt the practices that could help counteract vulnerability. 
Further research is needed to see if the composite vulnerability indicator proposed in 
this article can be applied to study the risk behavior of farmers in other countries and 
possibly to compare the risk behavior of Turkmen farmers to that of farmers in other post-
socialist countries with different economic and social conditions.  
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